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Abstract 
We analyze the dynamics of banks’ regulatory capital ratios. Using monthly data of regula-
tory capital ratios for a subset of large German banks, we estimate the target level and the 
adjustment speed of the capital ratio for each bank separately. We find evidence that, first, 
there exists a target level for a substantial percentage of banks; second, that private banks and 
banks with liquid assets are more likely to adjust their capital ratio tightly; and third, that 
banks compensate for low target capital ratios with low asset volatilities and high adjustment 
speeds. Fourth, banks with a target capital ratio seem to use an internal lower limit for their 
current ratios that is just above the regulatory minimum of 8%. 
JEL-Classification: G21, G32 
Keywords:  Regulatory bank capital, target capital ratio, partial adjustment, Ornstein-
Uhlenbeck process 
    
Non-technical summary 
We analyze how regulatory capital ratios of banks evolve in the course of time. In particular, 
we try to tell whether capital ratios fluctuate almost randomly or whether they tend to ap-
proach a target capital ratio. There is reason to believe that there exists a target capital ratio 
for each bank, because a bank faces two conflicting goals regarding its capital ratio (and the 
target capital ratio may be the ratio which best reconciles the two goals): On the one hand, the 
capital ratio must not be too low because otherwise the supervisor or rating agencies may urge 
the bank to hold more capital; on the other hand, some important performance measures relate 
the profit to the capital, so that these performance measures are the smaller the more capital is 
employed. If the bank chooses a target capital ratio and tries to control the current ratio, then 
we expect to observe that the capital ratio tends to approach the target after an exogenous 
shock. It is this effect that we try to find in the data. 
In our empirical study, we use monthly data of regulatory capital ratios of 81 German large 
banks. The period is from October 1998 to December 2006. Our results can be summarized in 
four statements: (1) For a substantial part of the banks we can show that their capital ratios do 
not fluctuate randomly but tend to approach target values. (2) Private banks and banks with 
liquid assets are overrepresented among those banks whose management adjusts the capital 
ratio to a target level. (3) Banks compensate low target capital ratios with low risk of the as-
sets and with high adjustment speeds. (4) Banks with a target capital ratio seem to use an in-
ternal lower limit for their current ratios that is just above the regulatory minimum of 8%. 
 
    
Nicht technische Zusammenfassung 
Wir untersuchen, wie sich regulatorische Eigenkapitalquoten von Banken im Zeitablauf ent-
wickeln. Insbesondere versuchen wir zu unterscheiden, ob diese Eigenkapitalquoten weitge-
hend zufällig schwanken oder ob sie gegen einen Zielwert streben. Es gibt Grund zu der An-
nahme, dass es für jede Bank einen Zielwert für die Eigenkapitalquote gibt, denn eine Bank 
hat zwei widerstreitende Ziele für ihre Eigenkapitalquote (und der Zielwert kann als der beste 
Kompromiss angesehen werden): Einerseits darf die Eigenkapitalquote nicht zu gering sein, 
weil sonst die Aufsicht oder die Ratingagenturen auf eine bessere Kapitalausstattung drängen 
würden; andererseits beziehen wichtige Erfolgskennzahlen den Gewinn auf das eingesetzte 
Kapital, so dass diese Erfolgskennzahlen sinken, je mehr Eigenkapital gebunden ist. Wenn der 
Vorstand der Bank einen Zielwert für die Eigenkapitalquote vorgibt und sie danach steuert, 
dann wird sich die Eigenkapitalquote nach einem äußeren Schock wieder diesem Wert annä-
hern. Im Rahmen unserer empirischen Studie versuchen wir, diesen Effekt in den Daten nach-
zuweisen. 
In unserer empirischen Untersuchung verwenden wir die monatlichen regulatorischen Eigen-
kapitalquoten von 81 größeren deutschen Banken, und zwar für den Zeitraum von Oktober 
1998 bis Dezember 2006. Unsere Ergebnisse können wir in vier Kernthesen zusammenfassen: 
(1) Wir können für einen erheblichen Teil der Banken zeigen, dass deren Eigenkapitalquoten 
nicht zufällig schwanken, sondern gegen einen Zielwert streben. (2) Private Banken und Ban-
ken mit liquiden Anlagen sind überproportional häufig unter denjenigen Banken, bei denen 
die Eigenkapitalquoten gegen einen Zielwert streben. (3) Banken kompensieren einen gerin-
gen Zielwert für die Eigenkapitalquote mit geringem Risiko bei den Anlagen und mit einer 
hohen Anpassungsgeschwindigkeit. (4) Banken mit einer Ziel-Eigenkapitalquote scheinen 
sich an einem internen Minimalwert für die momentane Eigenkapitalquote auszurichten, der 
knapp über dem aufsichtlichen Minimalwert von 8% liegt.    
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Banks’ capital ratios have received much attention because banks tend to have capital ratios 
by far lower than industrials, and a failure of a systemically relevant bank may threaten to 
derail the economy as a whole. Banks face a trade-off when choosing the appropriate level of 
their capital ratio. On the one hand, regulatory authorities and rating agencies force the banks 
to maintain a minimum capital ratio. The regulatory lower limit for the total-capital ratio is 8 
percent, while rating agencies and other market participants insist that a bank holds a certain 
ratio of Tier 1 capital if it wants to obtain a certain rating. On the other hand, banks try to 
maximize their return on capital to satisfy their investors; in contradiction to Modigliani/Mil-
ler’s irrelevance theorem (1958), it is believed that banks can increase their performance by 
substituting capital with debt.  
We pose the following three research questions: (1) Do banks adjust their capital ratios to a 
predefined target level or does the capital ratio fluctuate randomly, driven only by stochastic 
shocks without tendency to a mean? (2) Which bank characteristics determine whether banks 
adjust their capital ratio? (3) In our setting, the probability of failing to meet the regulatory 
requirements depends on three strategic parameters: the target capital ratio, the adjustment 
rate, and the asset volatility. Is there a compensating relationship between these three parame-
ters, for instance do we find that banks with a high capital cushion have volatile assets and 
low adjustment speeds? 
Our contribution to the literature is twofold. First, we are the first to estimate a partial adjust-
ment model for the capital ratio that determines the adjustment rate for each bank separately. 
Using monthly (instead of yearly or at best quarterly) data, we can apply the tools of time 
series analysis, especially those of stationarity analysis. Second, we provide insights into the 
strategic behavior of the capital management of German banks. 
                                                 
1 Acknowledgement: We are grateful to Jörg Breitung, Klaus Düllmann, and Joachim Grammig for helpful com-
ments and ideas. We furthermore thank the participants of the Bundesbank seminar on banking supervision for 
useful hints. 2   
Our results can be summarized in four statements: (1) For a significant percentage of the 
banks investigated, we can reject the hypothesis of capital ratios fluctuating randomly, i.e., 
there seems to be a certain capital ratio that management seeks to obtain. (2) We observe that 
the adjustment rates vary across banks. In an econometric analysis, we show that private 
banks and banks with liquid assets are more likely to adjust the capital ratio tightly. (3) Banks 
with a high target capital ratio tend to have a high asset volatility and/or a high adjustment 
speed to maintain a certain probability of meeting the regulatory requirements. (4) Assuming 
perfect compensation among the three strategic parameters cited above, we can explain the 
interaction of asset volatility, target capital ratio, and adjustment speed with high power. We 
get the best fit to the data when we assume an internal lower limit for the banks capital ratios 
of just above the regulatory minimum of 8%. 
When analyzing the adjustment of capital ratios, most of the studies use a panel of firm data. 
Fama and French (1999) analyze a large panel of annual accounting and market data on non-
financial firms. They conduct panel regressions of the change of one-year-ahead book and 
market leverage on the mismatch between a target leverage and the current leverage. They 
find a much lower adjustment rate than we do, but the difference is not surprising, for several 
reasons. First, banks typically have more liquid assets than non-financials, allowing them to 
adjust leverage more quickly. Second, Fama and French’s target leverage is dynamic since it 
is specified as a firm-specific forecast, as opposed to the fixed target in our model. As such, 
mean reversion towards a moving target specifies the behavior in a much broader sense than 
that which we are testing for. Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) find similar results for a 
smaller sample of industrials. 
Flannery and Rangan (2006) analyze a sample of US firms to answer the questions of whether 
a target capital level for firms exists and how quickly firms close the gap between the current 
and the target debt ratio. They find that there does exist a target level and that the firms close 
approximately one third of the gap in one year. Lööf (2003) compares the adjustment rate in 
the USA, the UK and Sweden. He concludes that the speed of adjustment is higher in the eq-
uity-based economies (USA, UK) than in Sweden.  
Heid et al. (2004) analyze the capital ratios of German banks in a panel regression. They find 
that German savings banks try to maintain a certain capital buffer by adjusting their capital 
and their risk. Merkl and Stolz (2006) explore the banks’ capital buffers and their reaction to 
changes in the monetary policy. Using quarterly data of banks’ regulatory capital buffer, they 3   
can show that the capital buffer of a bank influences its sensitivity to a tightening of the 
monetary policy. Banks with a low capital buffer shrink their lending more strongly than 
banks with a high capital buffer. 
Our study is related to the studies cited above. However, the difference is that we can work 
with data of relatively high frequency (monthly data vs. yearly or at best quarterly data in the 
literature), enabling us to estimate the partial adjustment parameter for each bank separately.  
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the model, and in Section 3 we 
put forward hypotheses on the adjustment dynamics and on the bank characteristics that influ-
ence the dynamics. In Section 4, we present the data and give some descriptive statistics. Sec-
tion 5 gives the results of the empirical study, and Section 6 concludes. 
 
2 Model 
Our model is a discrete-time version of Collin-Dufresne/Goldstein’s (2001) partial-adjustment 
model. Unlike in the Merton (1974) model, the amount of debt is not exogenous, but depends 
on a target debt ratio and the ability of the management to adjust that ratio. The dynamics of 
our setup are exactly the same as in Collin-Dufresne/Goldstein (2001), yet we observe the 
process at discrete times only.  
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where  t W  is a standard Wiener process, μ %  is the drift, and σ %  is the volatility of the asset re-
turn. The process is observed at discrete times of step size Δ, so we set  : nn A A Δ = % . Note that 










E  from the solution of (1) in exponen-
tial form. The bank’s debt  n D  increases in the course of time at the same constant expected 
rate  μ . In addition to this deterministic (or planned) growth of debt, the bank’s management 
tries to adjust the current debt ratio  : / nn n LD A = , i.e. the complement of the capital ratio, to-4   
wards a predefined target level L . Following Collin-Dufresne and Goldstein (2001), we spec-
ify the dynamics of adjustment such that it will be convenient to switch to the logs of assets 
and debt: 
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E  (2) 
Taking the logs of Equations (1) and (2) and using lower-case letters to denote the log vari-
ables, we can rewrite (1) and (2) as 
  11 nn n aa μ ε ++ =+ + , (3) 
with i.i.d.  ()
2
1 ~0 , n N εσ + Δ %  and 
  () () () 1 nn n n n n dd l l d d a l μκ μκ + =+ + ⋅−=+ − ⋅ − + . (4) 
The right part of (4) illustrates how the log debt “pursues” log assets: If log debt exceeds log 
assets minus a buffer of size  l − , its growth rate falls below the mean growth of log assets, 
and vice versa. The coefficient  0 κ ≥  is a measure of the speed of adjustment: The higher the 
value of κ , the quicker debt is adjusted. If κ  equals zero, then the bank management does 
not adjust its debt after random shocks of the asset value but follows a simple strategy of con-
stantly raising debt at a deterministic rate. 
Remark  In Collin-Dufresne and Goldstein’s counterpart to Equation (4), there is no μ  
on the right side, which, at first glance, decreases the debt growth compared to our notation. 
But notation is the only difference in the end: What Collin-Dufresne and Goldstein call a tar-
get leverage is a bit lower than mean leverage in the long run. In our notation, target and long-
term mean leverage coincide. 
Taking the difference of Equations (4) and (3) and using the definition  11 1 nn n lda ++ + =−, we 
derive the following empirical implication: If the parameter κ  is greater than zero, then the 
log debt ratio  n l  follows a stationary autoregressive process of order 1 (AR(1)): 
  11 nn n ll α β η ++ =+⋅+  (5) 
with Gaussian  1 n η +  and 5   
  l ακ =⋅ (6) 
 1 β κ =− . (7) 
The standard deviation of  n η  equals the asset volatility  : ε σσ =Δ % .  
Again, this model fits precisely in Collin-Dufresne and Goldstein’s framework: Our AR(1) 
process is the observation of an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process at discrete times.  
As banks’ capital ratios tend to be low compared to those of non-financials, the log debt ratio 
approximately equals the negative capital ratio 
n CR ; using this approximation and Equations 
(5) to (7), we see that the bank management is assumed to partially adjust the capital ratio CR 
to the predefined CR: 
  () 11 nn n CR CR CR κε ++ Δ≈ ⋅ −+    (8) 
Remark  Equation (8) appears to be a natural starting point of modeling adjusted capital 
ratios. However, we don not use it by two reasons. First, Equation (8) generates nonsensical 
capital ratios above one with positive probability. Second, there is no simple stochastic differ-
ential equation for the capital ratio, the discrete-time observation of which would follow (8); 
the same applies to the asset value process. 
Equation (5) is central for testing the model. If a bank manages to keep the capital ratio rela-
tively constant at a predefined level l , then the parameter κ  is greater than zero and, accord-
ing to Equation (7), the parameter β  in the autoregressive process (5) is less than one. That is 
exactly the necessary condition for stationarity of the AR(1) process. In contrast, if the man-
agement is unable or unwilling to adjust the capital ratio, there will be no mean reversion and 
the bank’s capital ratio is just a unit root process, i.e.  1 β =  and, equivalently,  0 κ = . There-
fore, the question of whether the bank management adjusts the capital ratio to a predefined 
level is equivalent to testing the hypothesis  0 :0 H κ = , i.e. purely random behavior of the 
capital ratio, against hypothesis  1 :0 H κ > , i.e. adjustment of the capital ratio to a target level. 
In econometric terms, the test is a unit-root test for which we will use the Augmented Dickey-
Fuller (ADF) test. If we can reject the null hypothesis according to which the capital ratio 
follows a unit root process, we find support for the claim that the capital ratio is stationary and 
tends to return to a predefined level. 6   
Having established whether a certain bank adjusts its level of capital ratios to a predefined 
level, we estimate α , β  and 
2
η σ  with an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression. From their 
estimation and with the help of the delta method, we get point estimates of the relevant pa-
rameters κ  and l  and determine the asymptotic joint distribution of these estimates. From 
asymptotic theory we know that 
  () ()
ˆ
0, ˆ
d TN α α
β β
⎛⎞ ⎛⎞ −⎯ ⎯ →Σ ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ ⎝⎠ ⎝⎠
. (9) 
Let  (,) ' l θκ =  be the parameter vector and let  ()
' ˆˆ ˆ ˆ 1, / ( 1) θ β α β =− −  be its estimate. The fol-
lowing expression is then asymptotically normally distributed: 
  () () ˆ 0;
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3 Hypotheses 
Banks can lower the capital ratio in two ways. They can extend their business volume or they 
can reduce capital, for instance by repurchasing their own shares or by paying large divi-
dends. Correspondingly, banks can increase their capital ratio by shrinking the business vol-
ume or by raising additional capital. 
In the empirical study, we analyze the behavior of the bank management concerning the capi-
tal ratio. We formulate three different hypotheses.  
From the ability to take action as described above we derive our first hypothesis: Banks which 
are active in highly liquid markets, such as investment banks, can extend and shrink their 
business volume more easily than traditional commercial banks, which mainly hold illiquid 
loans. Banks with liquid assets are therefore more likely to adjust their capital ratio than other 
banks. We measure the degree of the assets’ liquidity by the ratio market, which corresponds 
to the market price risk over risk-weighted assets, including market price risk; i.e. market is 7   
trading book risk as a share of the entire risk of the bank. We break down our sample of banks 
into three subsamples of equal size. The first subsample consists of the banks with the lowest 
values of the variable market, the third subsample comprises the banks with the highest values 
of the variable market, i.e. the banks with a large portion of trading book risk. If our hypothe-
sis is true, the share of banks that adjust their capital ratio will be higher in the third subsam-
ple than in the other two subsamples. 
Not only the ability to adjust the capital ratio matters, but the incentive to actively control the 
capital ratio is important as well. Our second hypothesis is based on the assumption that re-
turn on equity, or ROE (without adjustment for risk) is still an important performance meas-
ure. If ROE is the common measure of profit, banks with a strong orientation towards share-
holder value are more likely to keep the capital ratio in relatively narrow intervals. Ceteris 
paribus, a decrease in the capital ratio seems desirable, as it increases the ROE, albeit at a 
rising cost of harming their external rating. In contrast, public sector banks have excellent 
external ratings due to explicit state guarantees until July 2005, whereas maximum profit is 
not their primary business objective. Our second hypothesis is therefore that private banks are 
more likely to adjust their capital ratio than public sector banks.  
Our third hypothesis is about the probability that a bank’s capital ratio will drop below the 
regulatory limit, called probability of insufficient regulatory capital (PIRC). Out hypothesis 
is that this probability does not vary much across banks, because there seem to be compensat-
ing effects: banks with a low target capital ratio tend to invest in assets of low volatility and 
those banks seem to be able to adjust their capital ratios quickly. There may be wide differ-
ences across banks concerning target capital ratios, adjustment rates and asset volatilities; 
however, the variation in the probabilities of failing to meet the regulatory requirements is 
assumed to be much lower. Furthermore, we assume that it is the regulatory limit of capital 
that motivates banks to adjust their capital ratios, contrasting with the hypothesis that zero 
capital is the relevant threshold banks care for. The alternative hypothesis would be that the 
probability of zero capital does not vary much across banks. We denote the state of zero capi-
tal by technical insolvency; the corresponding probability of technical insolvency is denoted 
by POTI . 
PIRC, the probability of failing the regulatory requirements, depends on three strategic pa-
rameters: the target debt ratio, the asset volatility, and the adjustment rate. The higher the tar-
get debt ratio, the more volatile the assets or the lower the adjustment rate, the more likely it 8   
is that regulatory failure will occur. To keep this probability constant in the event of increased 
asset volatility, one has to decrease the target debt ratio or to increase the adjustment rate. We 
run the following cross-sectional regression to test whether this compensatory behavior really 
exists: 
  () () 12 , ii i i ll εε β κκ β σσν −= − + − +, (12) 
where  l ,  κ , and  ε σ  denote averages over the sample of banks. If there is relatively little 
fluctuation in the probability of regulatory failure, one will see compensatory effects leading 
to a positive sign for  1 β  and a negative sign for  2 β . Note that we neither associate causality 
with putting the target debt ratio on the left side of (12) nor do we hope to find something out 
about causality this way.  
We more specifically investigate whether the relationship between the three strategic parame-
ters can be explained by a global PIRC for all banks. A unique PIRC establishes a determi-
nistic relationship between l , κ , and  ε σ  that no bank will follow to perfectly; some banks 
will not at all. By “explaining” we mean that the deterministic relationship fits with the 3-
dimensional scatterplot of the banks’ parameter choices in the () ,, l ε κσ -space. 
As we consider a bank’s parameter triplet as a strategic long-term choice, the definition of 
PIRC is correspondingly chosen as the probability of falling below the minimal regulatory 
capital under the stationary distribution. Intuitively, that is the distribution after a long time 
from now. Mathematically, we require strict stationarity, meaning that the process () n n l
∈  
follows a distribution that is independent of time n. The AR(1) process of (5) with Gaussian 











for which β  must be smaller than one. Even if the distribution of  0 l  is not identical with (13), 
it will be approximated by that of  n l  for large values of n under mild assumptions.
2  
                                                 
2 A finite second moment for 
0 l  is sufficient. 9   
A certain regulatory capital ratio must never fall below some critical threshold 
* CR ; the own-
funds ratio, for instance, is always to be kept above 8%. It means for the log leverage ratio 
that 
*
n ll ≤  with  ()
** ln 1 0.08338 lC R =− ≈ −  must hold for all n. We fix a certain n and de-
fine PIRC as the probability of the event { }
*
n ll > . With (13) and strict stationarity, we obtain 
a probability that is independent of time n: 
  () ()
2
** 1









where  Φ denotes the standard normal cumulative distribution function. Note that PIRC de-
fined this way is not the probability of migrating from 
*
n ll <  to 
*
1 n ll + ≥  but equal to the ex-
pected share of the sojourn time that  n l  will spend above 
* l  or, equivalently, that the capital 
ratio will spend below 
* CR . 
Our assumption that PIRC be the same for all banks establishes a deterministic relationship 
between  β  (being equal to 1 κ − ), σ , and  l . To make it comparable to (12), we denote by 
1 − Φ  the standard normal quantile function and transform (14) to an equation that takes the 









 .  (15) 
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. (16) 
Associating the errors with the targets  i l  is somewhat arbitrary. We also could have rear-
ranged (15) with  ε σ  or β  on the left-hand side or even stay with (14), adding errors to 
PIRC. While the last option would rule out a comparison with the linear model, we prefer  i l  
on the left-hand side of (15) since only this version has a plain additive constant (
* l ) on the 
right-hand side, which makes it easier to be compared with the linear model. 10   
Similar to the PIRC, we define the probability of technical insolvency (POTI ) under the 
stationary distribution as the probability of negative capital at one fixed point of time 
  ()
2 1









and notice that POTI  should be interpreted with care: It is the mean share of the sojourn time 
the bank “spends in technical insolvency”, which is unrealistic in that a bank would hardly 
return from this state. Yet our definition of POTI  is closely related to the probability that the 
bank will lose all capital in the next period conditional on positive capital today.
3 The nonlin-














Returning to the calibration of PIRC, we minimize the squared errors in (16) and compare its 
explanatory power with that of the linear regression. Note that (16) has only one free parame-
ter, as opposed to three coefficients of the linear regression; equal power of both models 
would thus be evidence in favor of the nonlinear model. We compare the models with the 
Schwarz information criterion, which balances goodness of fit and simplicity. 
We finally check which value the critical threshold 
* l  is calibrated to if also used for least-
squares optimization of (16). With the implied threshold, we can measure whether the data 
possibly fit better with the hypothesis of a unique POTI  rather than that of a unique PIRC. If 
the  POTI  picture were to fit nicely, the calibration should end at an implied threshold 
* l  
closer to zero than to  () ln 1 8% − , for the example of the own-funds ratio.  
4 Data 
Our data consist of monthly observations of regulatory capital and risk-weighted assets for a 
subset of large German banks. Data on all German banks are available. However, we confine 
                                                 
3 Under the stationary distribution, the probability of technical insolvency in the next period, conditional on 
positive capital this period, is a function of POTI and mean reversion. It is strictly increasing in POTI for practi-
cally relevant values. 11   
ourselves to a subset of these banks, because small banks show very little variation in their 
capital ratios most of the time but substantial jumps at the end of the year when retained earn-
ings or losses abruptly change the capital ratio. To mitigate the problem of jumping capital 
ratios, we consider only those banks which meet the following two criteria: 
1.  The bank reports consolidated figures for regulatory capital and risk-weighted assets. 
2.  Average Risk-weighted assets exceed one billion euros. 
In addition, we only include banks for which there are at least fifty monthly observations. 
After applying the criteria, the whole sample consists of 81 banks. 25 of these banks belong to 
the first pillar of the German banking system, the private banks; 32 banks are part of the pub-
lic sector, which is composed of the savings banks and the Landesbanken, and 15 banks be-
long to the cooperative sector. Nine banks cannot be assigned to any of the above three sec-
tors.
4 As the sample is biased towards the large banks, it is not representative of the German 
banking sector.  
For each bank and each point in time we calculate three different capital ratios: the Tier 1 ra-
tio, the total-capital ratio, and the own-funds ratio. The first one—the Tier 1 ratio—is Tier 1 
capital over risk-weighted assets. Risk-weighted assets are obtained by allocating the assets of 
the banking book to different risk buckets. The Basel Accord implicitly stipulates that the Tier 
1 ratio exceeds 4 percent. The second and widest-spread ratio is the total-capital ratio. It is 
defined as total capital over risk-weighted assets. In addition to the Tier 1 capital, the total 
capital includes supplementary capital, such as parts of undisclosed reserves and subordinated 
debt with a long maturity. The Basel I Accord fixes 8 percent as the lower limit for the total-
capital ratio. Among the three capital ratios considered, the own-funds ratio is based on the 
most comprehensive definition of capital and assets. In addition to total capital, the own funds 
comprises subordinated debt with a relatively short residual term and unrealized profits in the 
trading book. The denominator consists of the risk-weighted assets in the banking book and, 
additionally, of those in the trading book. Also the own-funds ratio must not fall below 8 per-
cent. 
                                                 
4 These nine banks include special-purpose banks (Förderbanken) and building associations. 12   
The German regulatory authorities have monthly data on equity ratios from October 1998 to 
December 2006, which means that we have a maximum of 99 observations for one bank. In 
Table 1 we give summary statistics of the three log debt ratios (which approximately corre-
spond to the negative capital ratios) and the trading book risk, given as a percentage of total 
bank risk. Note that there are two dimensions, the cross-sectional dimension consisting of 81 
units (banks) and the time dimension consisting of up to 99 observations. 
Variable  Observa-
tions  Mean  Stand. 
dev. 
10% low-
est  Median  10% 
largest 
Negative log debt ratio 
(Tier 1 capital)  7081  8.90% 7.25% 5.46% 7.44%  12.26% 
Negative log debt ratio 
(total capital)  7081  13.52% 11.23%  9.64%  11.58% 16.72% 
Negative log debt ratio 
(own funds)  7081 12.02%  3.60% 9.41%  11.13%  15.26% 
Share of market risk 
(market)  7081  5.54% 10.05% 0.00%  1.81% 14.50% 
Table 1: Summary statistics of negative log debt ratios and of the variable market, measured by trading book risk 
over total bank risk 
For each bank we calculate the time series mean of each of the four variables. The results are 
displayed in Table 2. 
Variable  Ob-
servations Mean  Stand. 
dev. 
10% low-
est  Median 
10% 
largest 
Negative Log debt ratio 
(Tier 1 capital)  81  8.93% 5.71% 5.97% 7.53%  12.61% 
Negative Log debt ratio 
(total capital)  81  13.55%  7.93%  10.09% 11.77% 15.82% 
Negative Log debt ratio 
(own funds)  81 12.03%  2.56%  9.98%  11.38%  15.20% 
Share of market risk  
(market)  81  5.34% 9.45% 0.11% 1.60%  12.79% 
Table 2: Summary statistics of the time series means for the relevant variables 
The total variance of a variable (as displayed by standard deviations in the fourth column of 
Table 1) is the sum of the serial variation around the banks’ means and the variation of the 13   
banks’ means itself (as displayed by standard deviations in the fourth column of Table 2). For 
instance, as the total variance of the log debt ratio (own funds) is 12.98E–04 ( = (3.60%)²) and 
the variation of the banks’ time series means (own funds) is 6.57E–04 ( = (2.56%)²), the 
variation of log debt ratio (own funds) around the banks’ means must then be 6.41E–04. For 
this variable, about half of the total variation is due to the cross-sectional differences between 
the banks (51%); the time series variation accounts for about 49% of the total variation. This 
almost equal splitting into cross-sectional and serial variation can be found for the other log 
debt ratios as well; for the variable market the cross-sectional variation is dominant.  
5 Results 
In Table 3, we report the number of banks for which we are able to reject the null hypothesis 
of a unit root process. 
Number of banks with unit root process rejected for  Signifi-
cance level 
# of 
banks  Tier 1 ratio  Total-capital r.  Own-funds r. 
1% 81  6  14  12 
5% 81  12  22  24 
10% 81  17  27  31 
Table 3: Summary results of the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) Test for the three different capital ratios. We 
include a constant but no trend term in the estimation. The number of lags is determined with the Schwarz in-
formation criterion. 
We see that we can reject the hypothesis of a unit root process, i.e. of unadjusted capital ra-
tios, in 31 out of 81 cases for the own-funds ratio at the 10% level. It is not justified to con-
clude that the other 50 banks do not adjust their capital ratio. Rather, it may be that there is a 
mean reversion, but that the mean reversion is not strong enough to make the test reject the 
hypothesis of a unit root process. For the following analyses, we split the sample of 81 banks 
into those banks for which we can reject the null hypothesis of a unit root process at the 10%-
level (adjusting banks) and into the rest of the banks. Depending on the capital ratio under 
consideration, the sample comprises 17 (Tier 1 ratio), 27 (total-capital ratio), or 31 banks 
(own funds ratio). 14   
Table 4 gives an overview of the estimated parameters, i.e. the adjustment coefficient κ , the 
target debt ratio l  and the asset volatility  ε σ . We include only those banks for which we can 
reject the null hypothesis of a unit root process at the 10% level. To obtain the estimates, we 
run regression (5) for each bank; then we calculate the parameters according to the Equations 
(6) and (7). The standard errors in the last three columns are obtained from Equation (11). 
Estimated coefficient  Estimated standard errors 
Parameter  Capital 
ratio 
# of 
banks  10% 
lowest  Median  10% 
largest 
10% 
lowest  Median  10% 
largest 
Tier 1   17  7.16%  19.48%  48.89%  3.27%  7.65%  15.57% 




month)  own-funds  31  9.47% 20.18%  51.09% 4.17%  7.80% 15.24% 
Tier  1    17  5.67% 8.08%  12.66%  0.07% 0.31% 1.68% 




own-funds  31  9.82%  10.55%  13.29%  0.12% 0.27% 0.65% 
Tier 1   17  0.12%  0.42%  2.01%  -  -  - 




month)  own  funds  31  0.25% 0.59% 1.47%  -  -  - 
Table 4: Summary statistics of the relevant estimated parameters. 
We see that the adjustment coefficients vary greatly across banks, but the adjustment coeffi-
cient is significantly different from zero for most of the banks in the subsamples. For the own 
funds ratio we observe a median adjustment coefficient of 20.18% per month. This value 
means that the average bank closes the gap between the current and the target own funds ratio 
by some 20 percent per month. If there were no further random shocks, the bank would halve 
the gap in a bit more than three months.  
As stated before, the negative log target debt ratio is approximately equal to the capital ratio 
and, in the following, we will keep this interpretation in mind. We see that the target Tier 1 
capital ratio for the median bank is about 8 percent and the median target values for the total 
capital and the own-funds ratio are a bit less than 11 percent. Seemingly, the target capital 
buffer of the median bank is about 4 percentage points for the Tier 1 ratio and 3 percentage 
points for total-capital ratio and own funds ratio. 15   
The implicit asset volatility is a bit more than one-half percent per month or just above 2% per 
year. Using the Tier 1 ratio, we get slightly lower estimates for the asset volatility than using 
the two other capital ratios. 
Our first hypothesis is that banks with a large share of liquid assets can more easily adjust 
their capital ratio to a target level. To check this hypothesis we break down our sample of 81 
banks into three subsamples of 27 banks each. As stated before, the first subsample contains 
the 27 banks with the most illiquid assets (as measured by the variable market, i.e. the trading 
book risk as a share of the entire risk), the second and third subsample contain the banks with 
medium and highly liquid assets, respectively.  
Number of banks with unit root process rejected for (10%-level)  Liquidity of 
assets (market) 
# of banks  
Tier 1 ratio  total-capital r.  own-funds r. 
Bottom third  27  4  8  8 
Medium third  27  6  8  8 
Top third  27  7  11  15 
All 81  17  27  31 
Table 5: Number of banks with unit root process rejected for at the 10% level, broken down into three subsam-
ples according to the liquidity of the assets. The liquidity of a bank’s assets is measured by the variable market, 
the trading book risk as a share of the entire risk of the bank. 
Table 5 shows that the number of banks with unit root process rejected for is the highest for 
the third of banks with the most liquid assets. Applying Pearson’s 
2 χ -test of equal numbers 
in the three thirds, we can reject this hypothesis for the own funds ratio ( ()
2 5.12,2 7.7% χ = ). 
It is not surprising that we find the most supporting result for the own-funds ratio because 
market risk is a direct component of the own-funds ratio.  
We do not place too much weight on the above results, because they may be driven by hidden 
covariates. For instance, the sector affiliation may be such a hidden covariate: private banks 
tend to have a high share of market risk and—at the same time—private banks tend to adjust 
their capital ratio (see Table 6). 16   
Our second hypothesis is that privately owned banks adjust their capital ratio more rapidly 
than public sector banks. In Table 6, we display the results of the Augmented Dickey-Fuller 
(ADF) Test for the own-funds ratio broken down into the different banking sectors.  
Sector Private  Public 
sector 
Coopera-
tive  Other All 
Not  significant  9 28 9  4 50 
Significant at the 10% 
level  16 4  6  5 31 
All 25  32  15  9  81 
Share of significant banks  64%  13%  40%  56%  38% 
Table 6: Summary results of the ADF Test for the own-funds ratio, broken down into the banking sectors. 
Whereas it is possible to reject the unit root process hypothesis for 64% of the private banks 
(16 out of 25 private banks), the corresponding share for the public sector banks is 13% (4 out 
of 32 public sector banks). This result supports our second hypothesis, i.e. that privately 
owned banks are more likely to adjust their capital ratio than public sector banks. The 
2 χ  test 
of equality of all four shares is rejected at the 1% level ( ()
2 17.16,3 0.1% χ = ). For the other 
two ratio, the results are similar. 
Our third hypothesis is about compensatory effects with respect to the three strategic variables 
target debt ratio, adjustment rate and asset volatility. To analyze these effects we run regres-
sion (12) for the banks for which we can reject the unit root hypothesis at the 10%-level (We 
removed one outlying bank because its estimated target log debt ratio was above  () ln 1 8% −  
for the own funds ratio and the total-capital ratio).  
Explanatory variables  Tier 1 ratio  Total-capital r.  Own-funds r. 












R² 0.8829  0.7865  0.6938 
Observations 17  26  30 
Table 7: Results for the regression (12). Dependent variables: log target debt ratios. ***, ** and * denote signifi-
cance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. t-values in brackets. Outliers, i.e.   
log (target debt ratio) > –0.083 (for total-capital ratio and own-funds ratio), are removed. 17   
For the own-funds ratio, we find compensatory behavior concerning the three strategic vari-
ables: Banks with high target log debt ratios (i.e., low capital) tend to have high adjustment 
rates and low asset volatilities. For the Tier 1 ratio and the total-capital ratio the coefficient for 
the adjustment rate has the wrong sign. 
In order to see if a unique PIRC being striven for by all banks can explain the compensatory 
effects in the strategic variables, we estimate Equation (16) and (18) for the own-funds ratio. 



















fixed at 8%  0.93%  1.20% 




8.52%  2.14%  1.16% 
0  –8.659 67.1% 
Threshold 
zero 
(Æ POTI ) 
fixed at 0%  0.00%  5.04% 
–2.79%  –5.828 –525.0%
5 
Linear model  
(see Table 7)  — —  1.10% 
0  –8.651 69.4% 
Table 8: Results for the estimation of the nonlinear equations (16) and (18) and corresponding results of the 
linear regression (12), all based on own-funds ratios. Dependent variable of all models: estimated target log debt 
ratios. The nonlinear model is calibrated to least squared errors (1) by PIRC only (capital threshold fixed at 8%); 
(2) both by PIRC and capital threshold CR
*, and (3) by the POTI only (threshold fixed at 0%). Errors in Line 2 
and 4 have nonzero mean for lack of a free constant. The sample is restricted to observations with rejected unit 
root hypothesis at a significance level of 10%, after elimination of one outlier with an estimated target capital 
ratio far less than 8%. 
First, only the PIRC is calibrated towards least squared errors; the critical own-funds ratio 
* CR  is fixed at the regulatory level of 8%, which corresponds to 
* 0.0834 l =− . We obtain an 
implicit stationary probability of insufficient capital of 0.93%, which means that, on average, 
                                                 
5 Models without a free constant can actually generate negative R
2 18   
a bank lacks regulatory capital 0.93% of the time.
6 Note that we observed actions of rather 
healthy banks. For that, our implicit PIRC is presumably higher than its physical counterpart 
since bank managers, facing a big danger of regulatory intervention, will put more effort into 
maintaining a proper capital ratio than linear mean reversion presumes. 
Second, we optimize with respect to both the PIRC and the threshold 
* l  using least-squares. 
The corresponding best-fitting critical own-funds ratio 
* CR  is slightly above the regulatory 
8%, whereas the implied PIRC more than doubles due to its convexity in 
* l . It is this strong 
sensitivity to 
* l  that suggests not to interpret the level of the best-fitting PIRC directly. We 
put emphasis on the size of the threshold and on the ability to explain the interaction of the 
strategic parameters by a single background factor. 
Third, to check whether the implied threshold of the second analysis is robust, we estimate 
(18) by calibrating the POTI . The model does not fit at all, and the implicit POTI  is physi-
cally zero.  
Fourth, we compare the explanatory power of the models by the Schwarz information crite-
rion
7 (SIC); the lower its value, the better the model. The SIC rewards both for small errors 
and for the parsimonious use of parameters. According to the SIC, the nonlinear model based 
on 
* 8% CR =  fits best, while the two-parameter nonlinear model and the linear model are 
nearly on a par. Figure 1 summarizes the relationship of the models’ SIC. We let the (non-
optimized) capital threshold take values from 0% to 16% and plot the SIC of the correspond-
ing best-fitting nonlinear model. The SIC of the linear model gives a flat line, as it does not 
depend on 
* l ; the two-parameter nonlinear model is represented by a single point. The graph 
confirms the mild advantage of the one-parameter nonlinear model above the linear one and 
sharply disqualifies the zero-capital model. 
                                                 
6 Recall that we calculate by PIRC the mean sojourn time of the state of insufficient regulatory capital under the 
stationary distribution. 
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Figure 1: Schwarz information criterion (SIC) for the linear model and different versions of the nonlinear model. 
According to given critical capital thresholds (on the abscissa), the solid line plots the SIC value after optimiza-
tion of the probability to fail the given threshold; diamond: SIC of the nonlinear model when also the threshold is 
optimized; dotted line: SIC of the linear model (unaffected by threshold). 
In addition, we apply a log-likelihood test to see whether restricting 
* l  to –0.083 reduces the 
explanatory power, compared with optimizing 
* l . As Figure 1 already suggests, the null hy-
potheses (no loss of explanation) is not rejected, contrasting the test of 
* 0 l =  against opti-
mized 
* l  with a clear rejection. 
As a supplementary analysis, Figure 2 makes clear that the nonlinearity of our model is sub-
stantial. According to (15), the surface maps relevant values of  ε σ  and κ  to the predicted 









































































Figure 2: Target log debt ratio as a function of asset volatility and mean reversion, according to the estimated 
nonlinear regression forecast (15); estimation from Table 8, Line 2: capital threshold at 8%, PIRC = 0.93%; both 
variables between their lower and upper deciles of the sample. 
To sum up, we state that the “regulatory threshold story” fits better with our data than a linear 
model and much better than the “technical insolvency story”. 
6 Conclusion 
The aim of the paper is to obtain an insight into how German banks’ management adjusts 
capital ratios. Using relatively high-frequency data, we can analyze the capital ratio for each 
bank separately. It turns out that the capital ratio adjustment in private banks and banks with 
liquid assets tends to be more pronounced. Banks seem to choose a mix of adjustment rate, 
asset volatility and target debt ratio so as to maintain a certain probability to fulfill the regula-
tory requirements on the own-funds ratio. 
We expect that after introduction of Basel II, with an increased orientation to the capital mar-
ket and a stronger link between internal and regulatory risk management, the effects will be 
even more distinct. 21   
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